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 SPECIAL ISSUE 
 Linking Hypotheses in Visual Neuroscience:
A Tribute to Davida Teller 
 Introduction 
 Despite being called a materialist by none other than Vladimir 
Ilyich Lenin, Thomas Henry Huxley was a subtle dualist. Quoting 
a notorious remark by the French physiologist, he objected: “When 
Cabanis said that thought was a function of the brain, in the same 
way that bile secretion is a FUNCTION of the liver, he blundered 
philosophically. Bile is a product of the transformation of material 
energy. But in the mathematical sense of the ‘function’ thought 
may be a function of the brain. That is to say, it may arise only when 
certain physical particles take on a certain order.” (Letter from 
T.H. Huxley to Mr. McClur, 1881; original emphasis.) 
 For a relation from domain  X to range  Y to be considered a 
function, distinct values in  Y must correspond to distinct elements 
in  X . The square root can thus be considered a function, but the 
arctangent cannot because distinct values in its range correspond 
to the same element in its domain (e.g., arctan 0 = 0 and arctan 
0 =  π ). It will be seen that Huxley’s idea of a functional relation 
from brain states to perception implies that two different per-
ceptions must correspond to two different brain states. Nearly 
all neuroscientists believe that Huxley’s idea is correct, but they 
would also concede that it would not be testable for many 
thousands, perhaps millions of years, because we cannot state with 
confi dence when two brain states are identical. Time travel would 
be a useful tool for doing this but is not part of the neuroscientist’s 
toolkit. 
 Brindley ( 1960 , p. 144) proposed what was intended to be a 
useable version of Huxley’s idea and called it a “linking hypo-
thesis”: “…whenever two stimuli cause physically indistinguishable 
signals to be sent from the sense organs to the brain, the sensa-
tions produced by these stimuli, as reported by the subject in words, 
symbols or actions, must also be indistinguishable” (Brindley, 
 1960 , p. 144). This is saying that two different sensations cannot 
correspond to a single brain state, in other words that sensations 
are a function of brain states. An example of Brindley’s linking 
hypothesis is that if two lights cause identical quantum catches in 
the three classes of cone, then they must cause the same sensation. 
The linking hypothesis does not state that two lights giving rise to 
the same sensation of color must cause identical quantum catches 
nor should it (consider the case of central achromatopsia). Therefore, 
we cannot directly infer anything about brain states from the case 
of equal sensations. A more useful version of the linking hypo-
thesis is that if two sensory inputs to the brain cause different 
sensations, then they must have different effects on the brain. In 
other words, if we can discriminate between two stimuli, there 
must be at least one neuron that can also discriminate them. The 
task of the neuroscientist is to fi nd the locus of these neurons. 
As Teller and Pugh put it:
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 Most visual scientists probably believe that there exists a set 
of neurons with visual system input, whose activities form 
the immediate substrate of visual perception. We single out 
this one particular neural stage with the name: the  bridge 
locus . The occurrence of a particular activity pattern in these 
bridge locus neurons is necessary for the occurrence of a 
particular perceptual state; neural activity elsewhere in the 
visual system is not necessary…. Most visual scientists 
would agree that they [ sc the bridge neurons] are certainly 
not in the retina (Teller & Pugh,  1983 , p. 581, parenthesis 
added).  1  
 Examples of this approach are the measurement of neurometric 
functions corresponding to the psychometric functions for vernier 
acuity (Parker & Hawken,  1985 ; Hawken & Parker,  1987 ) and 
motion direction discrimination (Newsome et al.,  1989 ). 
 No meaning can be given to the statement that two inputs give 
rise to the “same” sensation unless we have an established method 
for determining that they are not different. To show that two lights 
are metameric requires a demonstration that the observer required 
to discriminate between them performs at chance, which in prac-
tice means not signifi cantly better than chance. Conversely, the fact 
that two lights are not metameric must entail that discrimination 
performance is signifi cantly greater than chance. For a shortcut that 
avoids measuring probabilities, the method of adjustment is often 
used, which allows the observer to minimize the perceived differ-
ence between two stimuli. The fact that this method works at all 
deserves more comment than it usually gets. It must mean that 
observers can set a criterion for determining when two stimuli are 
as similar as possible, else they would continue their adjustment for 
ever. One has only to imagine trying to get a rat to set a metameric 
match (without reinforcement, evidently) to see how interesting it 
is that humans can perform the task reliably. We accept the method 
of adjustment only because it is logically underpinned by the mea-
surement of probabilities. 
 Our ability to measure discrimination by probabilities without a 
subjective element (defi ned below) is what makes psychophysics 
a branch of applied physics and explains the emphasis Brindley 
placed upon what he called “Class A” observations. Class A obser-
vations defi ne the class of stimuli that are discriminable, and by 
exclusion, those that are indiscriminable. Class B observations are 
all the rest. W.S. Stiles, a physicist working at the UK National 
Physical Laboratory at Teddington, carried out only Class A obser-
vations and would decline invitations to comment on how many 
unique hues there were, or whether there is a sharp divide between 
the sensations of blue and green (Mollon,  1986 ). The aim of 
Class A observations is to take the psyche out of psychophysics. 
The fact that the just noticeable difference (JND) in vernier offset 
is in the hyperacuity range of  ∼ 5 arcsec is a Class A observation. 
The fact that two vertically aligned Gabor patches with stationary 
envelopes appear misaligned if their carrier gratings drift in oppo-
site directions is a Class B observation (De Valois & De Valois, 
 1991 ). This example illustrates, as Brindley emphasized, that Class B 
observations are not at all uninteresting, but they do have a dif-
ferent logical status from Class A because they lack the clarity of a 
clear linking hypothesis. 
 Another kind of distinction, related to Class A  versus Class B, 
is explained by Sperling et al. ( 1990 ). A Type 1 observation gives 
an observer a task to perform that has a correct answer, such as 
whether one grating has a higher contrast than another or whether 
a line is tilted clockwise or anticlockwise of the vertical. The 
observer could be trained to perform the task without any verbal 
instructions if given feedback (aka “reinforcement”). Sperling et al.’s 
criterion for a Type 1 task, therefore, relates to another, the “pigeon 
test” (John Mollon, personal communication). If you can train a 
pigeon to perform the task, it is Class A/Type 1. If not, it is Class B. All 
“illusions” are Type B. This is why it is diffi cult to demonstrate them 
in animals. A pigeon could be trained to peck at the longer of two lines 
with reinforcement and then given a transfer test without reinforce-
ment to the two versions of the Muller-Lyer fi gure. If it pecked the 
outgoing arrowhead version, we would have learned very little. The 
bird might have learned in the original training to peck the fi gure 
with the larger outline. There is no transfer test that can ever show 
that the bird “sees” the line with the outgoing arrowheads as longer. 
 However, the criterion of a task having a correct answer is only 
necessary for it to be Class A, not suffi cient. Consider again the 
illusion of the misaligned, drifting gratings within stationary enve-
lopes. There is a correct answer in this task, namely that the enve-
lopes are aligned, but it is not the answer we want the observer to 
give, so we are unable to use feedback/reinforcement.  2  The expla-
nation of this apparent paradox is that if we measure a psychometric 
function, using a question to which there is a correct answer, 
there are two things that we can measure: the slope of the function, 
which is a measure of discrimination, and the central tendency of 
the function, which is a bias. The underlying distinction between 
Class A and Class B observations is not whether there is a correct 
answer or whether we use the method of “forced choice,” but whether 
we measure the JND or the bias. Some investigators appear to think 
that they can avoid biases by using a method of forced choice, but 
there they “blunder philosophically.” 
 Signal detection theory clarifi es the distinction between dis-
criminability and bias with the twin concepts of internal noise and 
the observer’s criterion. Discriminability is limited by internal 
noise, and the aim of a bias-free method is to measure that internal 
noise. The decisional criterion is a rule that the observer uses to 
select a response, given the sensory data. For example, in making a 
vernier acuity decision with the method of single stimuli (MSS), 
the observer has access to a noisy signal with a value along a 
dimension going from “left” to “right” but must select some value 
along that criterion to defi ne as the watershed. If there is an illusory 
offset (De Valois & De Valois,  1991 ), we fi nd that the midpoint of 
the psychometric function has shifted from zero. This could be 
because the position of the signal + noise function has shifted along 
the sensory continuum or because the position of the decisional 
criterion has changed. From the point of view of signal detection 
theory, these alternatives are logically the same, and this is the 
crux of the diffi culty with Class B observations. 
 To make this point, Morgan et al. ( 2012 ) attempted to see 
whether observers could voluntarily shift their bias with the 
MSS without affecting the slope of the psychometric function. 
An increasing number of reports in visual cognition seem to be 
measuring perceptual biases due to adaptation, attention, and 
 
1
 The problem, as argued in Morgan ( 2003 ), is to show that other 
neurons are unnecessary. We cannot deprive a neuron of its input and 
output and determine that it has sensations. The idea that a single neuron 
can have a sensation is tantamount to “the secretion theory” Huxley attributed 
to Cabanis. 
 
2
 We could use feedback and see if this fl attens the psychometric 
function during early trials while the observer establishes a new criterion. 
Potentially, this is a powerful Class A measurement of a genuine perceptual 
bias and could be used, for example, to test the claim that autistic children 
are supernormal at ignoring context. 
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illusions with the MSS, without ruling out the possibility that these 
biases are due to changes in the observer’s decisional criterion. 
Examples include: (i) a movement aftereffect caused by imagining 
the adapting stimulus (Winawer et al.,  2010 ), (ii) a decrease in the 
motion aftereffect caused by distracting attention from the adaptor 
(Taya et al.,  2009 ) and the apparently spatiotopic version of the 
tilt aftereffect due to motion (Turi & Burr,  2012 ). 
 Fig. 1 (top left) shows data replotted from Winawer et al. ( 2010 ), 
showing the typical horizontal shift of the psychometric function 
due to adaptation in the MSS. As is commonly found, the shift is 
less than the standard deviation of the psychometric function and is 
thus less than the conventionally defi ned JND. The other panels in 
 Fig. 1 shows results for a three-stimulus vernier alignment task in 
which the observer had to decide whether the middle Gaussian 
blob was shifted upward or downward of the axis defi ned by the 
two outer blobs. In one condition, the observers guessed when 
they were unsure in the normal manner. In another condition, they 
responded “up” when unsure. Unsurprisingly, the psychometric 
function was shifted in the latter condition. More interestingly, 
it was unchanged in slope, in the sense that a fi t to the data with 
one standard deviation and two different means was not signifi cantly 
better, by a likelihood test, than a fi t with two standard deviations 
and two means. It will be seen that the effect of the guessing rule 
on the psychometric function was found not only at near-zero cue 
levels but also propagated out to large values. This is exactly what 
is predicted from a signal detection model in which the guessing 
strategy changes the observer’s decision criterion but not the 
noise. 
 Morgan et al. also showed that observers could shift the mean 
of their psychometric functions in a three-dot bisection task, and 
that they could be trained with feedback to change their criterion 
without loss of precision. The message of these fi ndings is simple. 
A shift in the mean of a psychometric function established with 
MSS could be due to a sensory process like adaptation or attention, 
but it is logically indistinguishable from a change in the observer’s 
decisional criterion. The MSS may thus not be the ideal method for 
  
 Fig. 1.  The fi rst panel (top left) shows data from Winawer et al. ( 2010 ). The vertical axis shows the probability of classifying the motion 
direction left  versus right. The circles show data from the unadapted condition, the squares show the effect of adapting to an imaginary 
moving stimulus. The remaining panels show psychometric functions from a three-dot vernier alignment task in which the magnitude of 
the physical shift of the center dot (horizontal axis) was sampled from a set of fi xed values without replacement. The units of displace-
ment are Weber fractions as percentages (100 × target shift/interpatch distance). Negative shifts are shifts “down.” The vertical axis is 
the probability with which the observer classifi es a shift as “up”  versus “down.” Vertical bars are 95% confi dence limits based on the 
binomial distribution. The circles show data taken with the observers’ natural biases and the rectangles with a deliberately feigned bias 
in the opposite direction. All curves are best-fi tting two-parameter ( μ ,  σ ) cumulative Gaussian functions. The small horizontal bars at 0.5 
on the ordinate show the 95% confi dence intervals for the mean of the psychometric function  μ , obtained from 160 simulated runs of the 
experiment using the maximum-likelihood fi ts of  μ and  σ  . 
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the parametric investigation of context effects. The most persuasive 
context effects, including so-called illusions (Morgan,  1996 ), are 
those that can be clearly demonstrated. If a large audience gasps at 
a demo, this is unlikely to be explained by a subtle change in their 
decision criterion. The problems arise with effects that are not sus-
ceptible to demonstration and where the only evidence we have 
consists of small effects from the MSS. 
 Alternatives to MSS for the measurement of context and illusions 
 The following section will set out alternatives with examples for 
measuring illusions without using the MSS. The common theme in 
these examples is the use of two alternative forced choice (2AFC) 
with roving pedestals, the aim being to make it hard for the observer 
to mimic the effects of a genuine perceptual bias with an artifi cial 
decision criterion. The merits of the 2AFC (or more generally  m AFC) 
procedure as a bias-free measure of sensitivity have been argued 
many times (Blackwell,  1952 ; Green & Swets,  1966 ; Sperling et al., 
 1990 ; Jakel & Wichmann,  2006 ; García-Pérez & Alcalà-Quintana, 
 2012 ) and do not need rehearsing here. The use of  m AFC to 
measure perceptual biases is less well known. At fi rst sight, the use 
of a bias-free method to measure a perceptual bias seems to be 
impossible. Gheorghiu et al. ( 2011 ) used spatial 2AFC with two 
different adapting stimuli in different locations and two different 
tests in the same locations as the adaptors. The difference between 
the tests was adjusted keeping their geometric mean constant to 
fi nd the point at which the two tests seemed the same. However, the 
observer could still guess in favor of one of the two locations when 
unsure, and this would be indistinguishable from a perceptual bias 
induced by the adaptor. This problem can be fi xed by using a roving 
pedestal, as the following examples show. The purpose of the exam-
ples is to illustrate the psychophysical methodology, not the details 
of the stimuli, which have either been published already (Cases 1 
and 2) or will be published elsewhere. 
 Case 1: Effects of attention on motion adaptation 
 Some studies have found an effect of attention on adaptation 
(Chaudhuri, 1990 a , b ; Beck et al.,  2001 ; Rezec et al.,  2004 ; 
Taya et al.,  2009 ) but others have found no effect (Wohlgemuth, 
 1911 ; Rees et al.,  2001 ; Morgan,  2011 ), whereas yet others have 
found both positive and negative results in conceptual replications 
(Nishida & Ashida,  2000 ; Georgiades & Harris,  2002 ). The prob-
lem is that all the positive evidence and most of the negative has 
come from the MSS or from the duration of the motion aftereffect, 
which is clearly dependent on a decision criterion. It is hard to 
decide when a stationary stimulus has stopped moving, and the 
decision is easily infl uenced by instructions (Sinha,  1952 ). A tiny 
shift in the point of subjective equality (PSE) (much smaller than 
the JND, Taya et al.,  2009 ) could easily be an expectation effect. 
What we need is a 2AFC design with interleaved conditions to see 
if attention does indeed affect adaptation. 
 Morgan (2013 b ) used an attentional distraction design similar 
to that in other studies (e.g., Rees et al.,  2001 ). Observers adapted 
to two spatially separated grating patches moving in opposite 
directions (L  vs . R) while carrying out either an easy task or an 
attention-demanding central task. They then had to decide which of 
two briefl y fl ashed moving gratings, in the same positions as the 
adaptors, was moving more quickly. (Note that this is a discrimina-
tion of speed, not velocity, since the two gratings could be moving 
in opposite directions.) One of the two gratings, the standard, 
always had the same speed. The other, the test, was made slower 
by an amount that varied over trials in order to determine a psy-
chometric function relating the probability of choosing the refer-
ence as a function of the speed difference. The test was presented 
randomly in the top and bottom positions. In four separate inter-
leaved conditions, the two tests had directions LL, LR, RL, or 
RR. There is no decision rule such as “report top stimulus as faster,” 
which can produce consistent results across these four conditions. 
In fact, however, results were consistent with a single bias corre-
sponding to a reduction in perceived velocity of tests moving in the 
same direction as their adaptors. There was no effect of attentional 
load on the value of this bias. 
 Case 2: The motion-induced tilt aftereffect 
 Motion within a stationary aperture causes an apparent shift in 
position of the aperture in the direction of motion (Ramachandran & 
Anstis,  1990 ; De Valois & De Valois,  1991 ; Hayes,  2000 ). Thus, 
two vertically aligned Gabor patches with stationary envelopes 
and carriers moving in opposite directions appear to have a vernier 
misalignment. Adaptation to such a stimulus causes a tilt after-
effect in the opposite direction. The existence of a spatiotopic 
version of this adaptation is controversial (Knapen et al.,  2009 ; 
Turi & Burr,  2012 ; Zimmermann et al.,  2013 ). The purpose of an 
experiment reported by Morgan (2013 a ) was to determine whether 
this kind of adaptation is retinotopic or spatiotopic, and to confi rm 
a previous report that the strength of adaptation is independent of 
the relative orientation of adapting and test carrier gratings (McGraw 
et al.,  2002 ). 
 Observers adapted to a square array of four Gabor patches with 
moving carriers that made the square array appear distorted into a 
trapezoid. They then saw four briefl y presented stationary patches 
in roughly the same position as the adaptors and had to decide 
whether the left-hand pair or right-hand pair was more tilted from 
the vertical. The actual angular difference was varied over trials to 
determine the psychometric function relating choice probability to 
physical cue. In one condition, the angular cue was in the same 
direction (+) as that expected from the tilt aftereffect; in the other 
condition, it was in the opposite direction (−). The two conditions 
were randomly interleaved. Also, the cue was applied either to the 
left-hand or the right-hand pair of patches. Since observers do not 
know on any trial whether they are dealing with a + or a − trial, they 
cannot mimic a perceptual bias by a guessing rule such as “left 
when unsure.” The method produced results consistent with a single 
bias parameter, representing a perceptual shift in the opposite 
direction to the adaptor. The previous report that the strength of 
adaptation is independent of the relative orientation of adapting and 
test carrier gratings (McGraw et al.,  2002 ) was confi rmed. In a 
spatiotopic version of the adaptation, observers moved their eyes 
between adaptor and test so that the left-hand test fell on the spatial 
position previously occupied by the right-hand adaptor. Results were 
consistent with an entirely retinotopic origin of adaptation. 
 Case 3: The “rod and frame” effect 
 A vertical rod seen within a tilted square frame can appear (to some 
people) tilted in the opposite direction to the frame (e.g., DiLorenzo & 
Rock,  1982 ; Dyde & Milner,  2002 ). We wanted to measure this 
effect with a 2AFC procedure in as bias-free manner as possible as 
a preliminary to determining whether the apparent vertical could 
also be shifted by saccadic adaptation (e.g., Rolfs et al.,  2010 ). 
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First, we wanted to see if the apparent alignment of two separated 
dots was affected by an outside frame. The MSS method for doing 
this would present a single dot pair within a frame and ask the 
subject whether they were tilted clockwise or anticlockwise of the 
vertical. But this judgment could easily be affected by cognitive 
factors. All the observer has to do to simulate a frame effect is to 
adopt the decision rule “when uncertain guess opposite to the tilt of 
the frame.” The schema for an alternative two AFC (temporal) task 
not subject to this problem is shown in  Fig. 2 . 
 Methods 
 Subjects viewed a computer-controlled visual display through a square 
frame cut out of black card positioned as close to the screen as pos-
sible. The room was made as dark as possible by black window blinds. 
The display screen was a Protouch ATM-173RHOACAD (17 Ǝ ) 
viewed from 78 cm. The fi xation point (white on black background) 
was placed in the center of a circle (also white) with radius 7.5 deg, 
visible to the subject as an arc within the frame. The actual position 
of the fi xation point and circle within the frame was jittered over 
trials to avoid the subject using landmarks on the screen. The rest 
of the circle was occluded by the frame. Dimensions of the frame 
were 13.8 × 13.8 deg. In different blocks of trials, the frame was 
tilted either 0, +7.5, or −7.5 deg. 
 On each trial, the fi xation point was presented for 500 ms, 
followed by the fi rst 2AFC interval of 1000 ms. During this 
interval, the fi xation point remained visible and a second dot 
was presented at some point on the circumference of the circle. 
We defi ne its position by the angle  θ a line connecting it to fi x-
ation would form with the vertical meridian. This was followed 
after a brief blank interval by the second 2AFC interval, with a 
dot positioned on the circle at position  θ ƍ . The subject’s task was 
to report whether  θ or  θ ƍ was closer to the subjective vertical, in 
  
 Fig. 2.  The fi gure illustrates 2AFC (temporal) task for measuring the effects 
of frame tilt upon perception of the apparent vertical. The observer’s task is 
to decide whether the dot pair in the fi rst or second interval is closer to the 
gravitational vertical. The correct answer in the case illustrated is the “second 
interval.” The Pedestal was varied between −2, 0, and 2 deg with respect to 
the true vertical. For further explanation see the text. 
  
 Fig. 3.  Results for observer MM. Each panel shows the probability of choosing the standard (pedestal) and frame tilt. The nine red curves 
are individual fi ts to the data in the nine panels. The magenta curves are four-parameter fi ts to all the data, assuming constant internal 
noise and a set of three equivalent pedestals arising from each of the three frames. For further explanation, see the text. 
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other words “was the fi rst or second dot closer to the vertical with 
respect to the fi xation point?” To clarify what we meant by “the 
vertical,” we told subjects that the vertical was at right angles to the 
fl oor, or equivalently, the shortest line from fi xation point to the feet, 
which were placed directly under the table carrying the monitor. One 
of the dots, “the standard,” formed a pedestal angle chosen from the 
list [−2 0 +2] deg with respect to the vertical. The other dot, “the 
test,” had angle pedestal +  x , where  x was chosen from the list [−4 −3 
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4] deg. The temporal order of test and standard was 
random. Every combination of standard and test was presented eight 
times in a random order. In other words, the three pedestals were 
randomly interleaved so the subject could not know on any trial 
whether either of the dots was in a true vertical position. Nor did they 
know which was the standard. Thus, no response bias along the lines 
of “chose the standard if unsure” could masquerade as a perceptual 
bias. However, with three psychometric functions for the three 
pedestals, any bias due to frame can be decoded. The experiment 
was repeated three times with different frame angles [−5 0 5]. 
 Results 
 The results for one subject (MM) are illustrated in  Fig. 3 . Each 
panel shows the psychometric function for one combination of 
pedestal and frame. At fi rst sight, the variety of psychometric func-
tions is bewildering, but it is actually easy to decode. The simplest 
case is 0 pedestal and 0 frame (top row, second column of the 
fi gure). Here, the pedestal is always vertical and is seen as such. 
The angular cue applied to the test moves it away from the vertical 
in either direction, resulting in increased probability of choosing 
the standard as being more vertical. Now consider pedestal −2 and 
frame 0. Positive angles to the test bring it closer to the vertical 
than the standard, resulting choice probabilities for the standard of 
 P < 0.5, and so on. The red curves are fi ts of the function  p = 
 Φ ([|ped + test +  μ ( f )| − |ped +  μ ( f )|]/ σ ( f )), where  p is the probability 
of choosing the pedestal,  Φ is the normal c.d.f., and  μ ( f ) and  σ ( f ) are 
the frame-specifi c bias and frame-specifi c internal noise, respectively. 
The magenta curves are fi ts of the function  p =  Φ ([|ped + test + 
 μ ( f )| − |ped +  μ ( f )|]/ σ ), where  σ is the same in all frame conditions. 
 Since the nine “magenta” functions in  Fig. 3 differ in only one 
free parameter  μ ( f ), they can be collapsed into three functions for 
the three different frames. This is done in  Fig. 4 for each of the 
remaining four subjects in the experiment. The three frame condi-
tions are indicated by different colors. 
 Table 1 shows the values of the frame bias  μ and internal noise 
for each of fi ve subjects tested so far, two of them (EP and BM) 
being entirely naïve. To interpret the sign of  μ recall that we expect 
a CW frame to cause an apparent ACW tilt of the virtual line 
joining the fi xation point to the target dot equivalent to a posi-
tive angular shift. Thus,  μ for a CW frame should be positive. 
Three subjects (MM, SG, and EP) showed an effect of the frame 
in the direction of the classical “rod and frame” effect. The other 
two (DM and EP) showed no clear effect. Individual differences 
in the rod and frame are well established (e.g., Spinelli et al., 
 1995 ), and we are currently carrying out head-tilt experiments to 
determine whether they arise from different use of gravitational 
 versus visual cues. 
 The method for determining the frame effect relies upon com-
parison with an internal standard, in this case of the vertical. For 
many other context effects, like the Muller-Lyer effect, there is no 
  
 Fig. 4.  The fi gure replots data of the kind previously shown in  Fig. 3 , with different symbols for the three frame conditions (red, frame 
0, green: frame CW, and blue, frame ACW). Each panel shows the results for a single subject. The fi tted magenta curve assumes different 
values of  μ ( f ) for the three frame conditions but the same value of internal noise,  σ .  p =  Φ ([|ped + test +  μ ( f )| − |ped +  μ ( f )|]/ σ ). 
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such standard, so it must be provided as an external reference. The 
next case describes an example. 
 Case 4: The Ebbinghaus circles surround effect 
 The Ebbinghaus size context effect ( Fig. 5 ) has become topical 
because of (disputed) claims that it does not affect grip aperture 
when subjects try to pick up real three objects (Goodale & Milner, 
 1992 ; Franz,  2001 ; Franz et al.,  2001 ; Glover & Dixon,  2002 ). 
 Methods 
 Stimuli were presented on the LCD display of a MacBookPro laptop 
computer with screen dimensions 33 × 20.7 cm (1440 × 900 pixels) 
viewed at 0.57 m so that 1 pixel subtended 1.25 arcmin visual angle. 
The background screen luminance was 50 cd/m 2 . 
 In the case of size discrimination, the 2AFC method cannot 
use an implicit standard such as the vertical, so a reference must 
be provided. This was done using the temporal sequence illus-
trated in  Fig. 6 . First, the “reference” circle was shown (1 s) at 
a physical size that did not vary throughout the experiment, 
although its context did. Then the two “comparison” stimuli were 
presented in sequence (0.5 s each). One of these was the stan-
dard, which had a pedestal size difference relative to the refer-
ence. The other was the test, which was increased in size relative 
to the standard over trials in order to determine a psychometric 
function. The subject’s task was to decide whether the fi rst or the 
second comparison stimulus was nearer in size (radius) to the 
standard. Standard and test were presented in a random order. 
Three different pedestals were randomly interleaved: −5, 0, and 
+5% (relative to the reference). Three context conditions were used 
corresponding to the three frame conditions in the previous exper-
iment. In the control case, both the reference and comparison stimuli 
had a small circle context (Condition S/S). In Condition S/L, the 
reference had a small circle context and the comparison stimuli both 
had a large circle context. Condition L/S was the reverse of S/L. Note 
that the context for standard and test (the comparison stimuli) was 
 Table 1.  Fitted values for biases (µ) and internal noise (σ) in the 
Rod and Frame Experiment (Case 3) 
Subject  μ 0 tilt  μ CW frame  μ ACW frame  σ 
MM 0.146 2.56 −1.24 1.54 
SG 0.17 6.02 −11.98 2.51 
DM 0.52 0.28 −0.61 1,68 
EP 0.35 −0.64 −0.24 1.54 
BM −0.8 2.45 −1.18 1.49 
  
 Fig. 5.  The Ebbinghaus size context effect. The central circle on the left 
may appear smaller than the equal size circle on the right. 
  
 Fig. 6.  Schema of the stimulus sequence for measuring the Ebbinghaus context effect with a two AFC method. First, the reference circle 
and the context were shown, which did not vary in physical size throughout the experiment. Then the two comparison stimuli were 
presented in sequence. One of these was the standard, which had a pedestal size difference relative to the reference. The other was the 
test, which was varied in size relative to the standard over trials in order to determine a psychometric function. The subject’s task was 
to decide whether the fi rst or second comparison stimulus was nearer in size (radius) to the reference. For further details, see the text. 
The condition illustrated is called L/S (large surround reference/small surround comparison) in the text. 
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always the same. The radius of the reference circle was 37.5 arcmin. 
The S context comprised eight circles each of radius 12.5 arcmin 
separated (center to center) from the center of the array by 12.5 
arcmin. The L context comprised four circles each of radius 50 arcmin 
separated (center to center) from the center of the array by 125 arcmin. 
The relative dimensions were closely similar to those in  Fig. 6 . 
 Data were obtained for two subjects (the author and a graduate 
student NN). 
 The logic of the experiment closely followed that of the previous 
experiment (Case 3, the frame effect) so results are presented ( Fig. 7 ) 
in the same way in  Fig. 4 . Once again, the effect of the context was 
modeled as an equivalent pedestal, with no effect on internal noise. 
 The results are summarized in  Table 2 . The two observers had 
biases in the same direction, but those of NN were greater. 
 Case 5: The Poggendorff effect 
 The “Poggendorff effect” is a classical geometric illusion in which 
actually collinear lines appear noncollinear, probably at least in 
part because of orientation repulsion (see Morgan,  1999 for review 
and evidence from MSS that the effect is increased by blur and is 
second order in terms of contrast). The experiment described here 
used the vertical version of the Poggendorff with two vertical par-
allels and two 45 deg oblique pointers. 
 Methods 
 As in the previous experiment, stimuli were presented on the LCD 
display of a MacBookPro laptop computer with screen dimensions 
33 × 20.7 cm (1440 × 900 pixels) viewed at 0.57 m so that 1 pixel 
subtended 1.25 arcmin visual angle. The background screen lumi-
nance was 50 cd/m 2 . 
 The procedure was 2AFC, temporal. One interval contained a 
standard with one of three randomly interleaved pedestal values of 
misalignment relative to the true alignment point. The other con-
tained a test with an upward displacement relative to the standard 
sampled from four prearranged levels. Test and standard were pre-
sented in a random temporal order. Observers decided which interval 
contained the more aligned stimulus. Note that this could be the test 
or the standard depending on the pedestal and the size of the puta-
tive Poggendorff bias. The observer has no way of knowing which 
interval is the test, which the standard, or which is really more 
aligned. The psychometric functions for the three pedestal levels 
were analyzed together with a two parameter ( σ ;  μ ) model as in 
the two previous cases. The subjects were the three authors. 
 Bias was defi ned as in previous examples as the equivalent of an 
additional pedestal. In this case, the bias was converted from dis-
placement units to degrees of rotation, that is, the misalignment 
that would be produced by rotating the pointer around its intersec-
tion with the vertical inducer. The data ( Fig. 8 ) revealed a bias in 
the direction of the Poggendorff effect ranging from 2.7 to 6 deg. 
The biases in a two-parameter ( μ ;  σ ) fi t when all three pedestals 
were combined were: 3.4 deg (MJM), 4.15 deg (DM), and 3.9 deg 
(JAS). Following these measurements, the bias was also deter-
mined by the MSS, using the conventional method of guessing 
whether the right-hand pointer was higher or lower than the imagi-
nary point of collinearity with the right-hand pointer. These values 
were: 0.67 deg (MJM), 2.86 (DM), and 1.75 (JAS). We cannot say 
why these values were lower in every case than the 2AFC values, 
but one possibility (apart from an order effect) is that experienced 
subjects tend to equalize the two response alternatives. 
 Other cases 
 It is left to the reader as an exercise to design roving pedestal 2AFC 
methods for measuring the Muller-Lyer illusion and other effects 
of context such as contrast–contrast (Chubb et al.,  1989 ). 
 Conclusion 
 Class A/Type 1 psychophysical procedures occupy a privileged 
position because they are based on a clear linking hypothesis 
  
 Fig. 7.  Figure shows psychometric functions taking into account the pedestal value and fi tted context bias for each observation. The 
 x -axis represents the internal signal on which the observer is assumed to base his decision. The different contexts are color coded: 
Condition S/S (red), Condition S/L (green), and Condition L/S (blue). 
 Table 2.  Fitted values for biases (µ) and internal noise (σ) in the 
Ebbinghaus Circles Experiment (Case 4). The units are Weber 
Fractions of circle radius (100*Δr/r)where Dr is the difference in 
radius between the two comparison stimuli 
Subject  μ context S/S  μ context S/L  μ context L/S  σ 
MM 0.49 −2.136 3.56 2.89 
NN 0.20 −13.84 12.25 8.10 
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and make no reference to subjective qualities of the stimulus. They 
can be performed on machines to measure their intrinsic noise 
on animals or, indeed, in human subjects who are not conscious 
of the stimuli. The purpose of Class B/Type 2 procedures is to 
measure bias; therefore, they can never be bias free. However, 
there are at least three sources of bias, which should be the goal 
of a correctly designed experiment to separate: (1) response biases, 
(2) decisional biases such as deciding in favor of one alternative 
when unsure, and (3) perceptual bias. The problem with MSS is 
that it confounds all three. We have argued that 2AFC can do a 
better job in separating decisional and perceptual biases particu-
larly if a roving pedestal is used. The growing and worrying number 
of contradictions appearing in the literature using MSS could pos-
sibly be stemmed by using  m AFC instead. 
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